Norman O. Whitaker Petitioner, v. Utah State Retirement Board and Utah State Retirement Office a.k.a. Utah State Retirement Systems, Respondents: Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Norman O. Whitaker Petitioner, v. Utah State
Retirement Board and Utah State Retirement
Office a.k.a. Utah State Retirement Systems,
Respondents: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David B. Hansen; Howard, Phillips & Anderson; Attorney for Respondent; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah
Atorney General.
Phillip W. Dyer; Carey A. Seager.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Whitaker v. Utah State Retirement Board, No. 20061103 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/7006
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NORMAN" ""HITAKER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
and UTAH STATE RETIREMENT 
OFFICE a.k.a. UTAH STATE 
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, 
• dents. 
'Rlhi ut j - i ' tL i . - , . \T 
Case No. 20061103 
URIEK OV AITI1ILANT NORMAN O. WHTTAKER 
AI'IM ,AL FROM THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, A STATE AGENCY 
DA\ ,,: n. i L ^ , i t l \ . t s Q . 
Attorney for Respondent Utah State 
Retirement Board and Utah State 
Retirement Office aka Utah State 
Retirement Systems 
HOWARD, PHILLIPS & ANDERSON 
560 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, ESQ 
Utah Attorney General 
State Capitol Complex 
East Office Building, #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
PHILLIP W. DYER, ESQ. 
CAREY A. SEAGER, ESQ. 
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER 
221 Kearns Buildir • 
136 South Main Stroci 
Salt Lake Cin-. Utah 84101 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 14 2007 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NORMAN 0. WHITAKER, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, ; 
and UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ; 
OFFICE a.k.a. UTAH STATE ] 
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, '] 
Respondents. ) 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I Case No. 20061103 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT NORMAN O. WHITAKER 
APPEAL FROM THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, A STATE AGENCY 
DAVID B. HANSEN, ESQ. 
Attorney for Respondent Utah State 
Retirement Board and Utah State 
Retirement Office aka Utah State 
Retirement Systems 
HOWARD, PHILLIPS & ANDERSON 
560 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, ESQ. 
Utah Attorney General 
State Capitol Complex 
East Office Building, #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
PHILLIP W. DYER, ESQ. 
CAREY A. SEAGER, ESQ. 
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . .. iv-vi 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES . . 2-4 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
AND RULES 4-5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5-22 
A. CASE, NATURE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION 5-7 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS . 7-19 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 19-22 
ARGUMENT 23-54 
I. THE USRB ERRED BY NARROWLY INTERPRETING 
UTAH CODE ANN. §49-11-401 (3)(c) & (e) IN A MANER 
CONTRADICTORY TO THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT 
THAT THE USRIBA BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN 
FAVOR OF AWARDING MAXIMUM BENEFITS AND 
PROTECTINGS TO NORM 23-30 
A. The USRB had not Provided any Written Documentation 
that its Statutory Interpretation Promotes Uniformity or 
Actuarial Soundness and the USRB's Decision is Therefore 
Not Entitled to Deference 25-26 
B. The Potential Statutory Limitation of §40 l(3)(c) Is 
Ambiguous and Should be Interpreted in Favor of Awarding 
Maximum Benefits in Behalf of Norm 26-30 
i 
Page 
II. THE USRB ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT UTAH 
CODE ANN. §49-11-401 (3)(C) DOES NOT EFFECT AN 
"INELIGIBLE" OR "FORFEITURE" STATUS REGARDING 
NORM'S 32.795 YEARS OF SERVICE CREDIT 30-36 
A. The USRB Erroneously Determined that Norm Does 
not Have any Forfeited Credit 30 - 31 
B. Purchase of Non Qualifying Service Credit Under 
§49-13-302 of the USRIBA 31-33 
C. Purchase of Forfeited Service Credit 33-34 
D. The USRB's Windfall 35-36 
III. THE USRB ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT EQUITABLE 
ESTOPEL DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE 36-50 
A. Challenged Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Estoppel 36-40 
B. The Facts Warrant the Application of Estoppel Against 
the USRB in Favor of Norm 40-50 
1. Estoppel is Appropriate Against the USRB as a 
Governmental Agency Acting in a Proprietary 
Capacity 40-42 
2. URS'Written Representations & Norm's Reasonable 
Reliance 42-47 
3. URS' Oral Representations & Norm's Reasonable 
Reliance 47-48 
4. Norm's Detrimental Reliance 48-49 
5. Unique Circumstances Involving Norm 49-50 
IV. NORM'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW BY 
THIS COURT HAS BEEN ABRIDGED BY THE URSB'S FAILURE 
TO PRESVE AN AUDIBLE AND COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF 
THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING HELD BELOW 50-54 
i i 
CONCLUSION & REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
ADDENDUM (bound separately): 
EXHIBIT A: Constitutional Provisions 
Page 
54 
EXHIBIT B: 
EXHIBIT C: 
EXHIBIT D: 
EXHIBIT E: 
EXHIBIT F: 
EXHIBIT G: 
EXHIBIT H: 
EXHIBIT I: 
EXHIBIT J: 
EXHIBIT K: 
EXHIBIT L: 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-101, et. seq.-
Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-101, et. seq. -
Public Employees' Noncontributory System Act -
Utah State Retirement Board Adjudicative Hearing 
Procedure 5(g) 
Request for Board Action dated January 18,2006 
(R. 004-010) 
Ruling of Hearing Officer Howe issued on August 15,2006 
(R. 239-240) 
Ruling on Petitioner's Objections to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order dated October 25, 2006 
(R. 348-351) 
Amended Recommended Findings of Facts [sic] and 
Conclusions of Law and Order of Hearing Officer Howe 
signed on October 26, 2006, and adopted by the Utah State 
Retirement Board on November 9, 2006 (R. 370-377) 
Norm's Exhibit 1 -Norm's Annual Retirement Statements 
from 2000-2005 (R.l 12-129) 
Norm's Exhibit 2 - Norm's 2004 Annual Retirement 
Statement (R. 130-136) 
Respondent's Exhibit 4 - Marcia Stroud's Calculation of 
Benefits (R. 158) 
Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing Dated June 14,2006, 
pertinent pages (R.383) 
i i i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES Page 
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 
795 P.2d 671, 674-7 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) 2, 3,21, 36 
40 - 42.45 
Forsgren v. Sollie, 
659 P.2d 1068,1069 (Utah 1983) 37 
Holland v. Career Service Review Board, 
856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) . . . . 37 
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Board, 
770 P.2d 93, 98 (Utah 1998) 24 
Murphy v. Crosland, 
886 P.2d 74, 80 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) 29 
Norville v. State Tax Comm'n, 
97 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1940) 27 
O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Board, 
929P.2d 1112,1118 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) 25 
Parr v. Stubbs. 
2005 UT App 310, H 7, 117 P.3d 1079 23 
Pugh v. Draper City. 
2005 UT 12, H 13, 114 P.3d 546, 549 (Utah 2005). 23 
Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 
509 P.2d 1274,1276 (Utah 1973) 33 
Sindt v. Retirement Board, 
2007 UT 16, H 5, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 71 2,3,25,26 
Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 
799 P.2d 231,233 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) 27 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 
818 P.2d 23,27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) 2 - 4, 22, 36, 
52-53 
i v 
CASES (Continued) Page 
Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 
886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) 3, 36 
Utah Public Employees Association v. State of Utah, 
2006 UT 9,1| 60, 131 P.3d 208 27,29 
West Valley City v. Roberts, 
1999 UTApp 358,1J14, 993 P.2d 252 22,50 
CONSTITUTIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 1 . 4 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7 4 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-101 et. seq. (2002) 4 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-102(38) (2005) 4,28 - 29 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-103(2) (2002) 1,4, 20,24 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-201 (2)(a) (2004) . 4 
Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-203(l)(d) & (k) (2002) 4 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401(3) (2005) 2,4, 19,20, 
23 - 35,39, 
44 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-403 (2006) 4,21, 32 - 34 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-607 (2003) 4, 35 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613(7) (2005) 1,4 
Utah Code Ann. §49-12-402(2)(a)(ii) (2005) 36 
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-102 (2006) 5 
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-201 (2005) 5 
v 
STATUTES (CONTINUED) Page 
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-302 (2002) 5, 20, 30-32 
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-402(2) (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 2.8, 35-36 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(l) (1988) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) (2001) 1 
RULES/PROCEDURES 
Utah State Retirement Board Adjudicative Hearing Procedure Rule 5(g)... 5, 50-51 
v i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NORMAN 0. WHITAKER, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, ; 
and UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ; 
OFFICE a.k.a UTAH STATE ; 
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, ; 
Respondents. ] 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
i Case No. 20061103 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT NORMAN O. WHITAKER 
APPEAL FROM THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, A STATE AGENCY 
I 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
In Utah Code Annotated §49-11-613(7) (2005), §63-46b-16(l) (1998), and §78-
2a-3(2)(a) (2001), the Legislature conferred appellate jurisdiction upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals to review appeals resulting from the final orders of formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies. This case involves the timely appeal by Norman O. 
Whitaker (herein "Norm") from a final order issued on November 9,2006, by the Utan 
State Retirement Board (herein the "USRB"), which is a State agency (see, Utah Code 
Ann. §49-1 l-201(2)(a) (2004)), that issued a final order styled, "Amended Recommended 
Findings of Facts [sic] and Conclusions of Law" (herein the "USRB's Decision"). 
II 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the USRB err by narrowly interpreting Utah Code Ann. §49-11-
401(3)(c) & (e) (2005) in a manner inconsistent with the Legislature's intent that the Utah 
State Retirement Insurance Benefit Act (herein the "USRIBA") shall be "liberally 
construed to provide maximum benefits and protections ..." to Norm as mandated by 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-103(2) (2002)? This issue was preserved below at R. 52 - 54, 
173-178. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is correction of error 
with no deference to the USRB's Decision because it involves a legal issue -
interpretation of a statute in a manner that is consistent with Legislative intent and the 
USRB has not provided any documentation that its statutory interpretation promotes 
uniformity or actuarial soundness. See, Sindt v. Retirement Board, 2007 UT 16, f 5, 570 
Utah Adv. Rep. 71; Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 
1991); Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 674-5 (Utah Ct.App. 
1990). 
2. Did the USRB err by determining that Norm is not entitled to purchase his 
15.708 years of earned service credit, even though the USRB also determined those years 
of service to be "ineligible" for service credit - and, in essence, "forfeited" to the USRB? 
This issue was preserved below at R. 56 - 57, 181 - 182. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is correction of error 
with no deference to the USRB's decision because it involves a legal issue-
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interpretation of a statute in a manner consistent with Legislative intent and the USRB has 
not provided any documentation that its statutory interpretation promotes uniformity or 
actuarial soundness. See, Sindt v. Retirement Board at f 5; Tolman v. Salt Lake County 
Attorney at 27; Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board at 674-5. 
3. Did the USRB err by determining that the USRB's prior representations to 
Norm do not warrant the application of equitable estoppel in this case? This issue was 
preserved below at R. 54 - 56, 178-181. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion 
with intermediate deference to the USRB's Decision because it involves the application 
of facts to the legal standard of equitable estoppel which is a mixed question of fact and 
law. See, Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct.App. 1994); 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney at 27; Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board at 
674-5. Further, to the extent that Norm challenges the USRB's factual findings incident 
to addressing this issue, those findings will be reviewed for clear error after giving 
deference to the USRB's findings. See, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney at 27. 
4. Did the USRB violate Norm's constitutional due process rights to effective 
judicial review by failing to make a complete record of the evidentiary hearing held 
below before the USRB's Hearing Officer? This issue was preserved below at R. 252, 
280,353-355.1 
1. The record is clear that Respondents were on notice of their potential problem with 
the accuracy of the transcript because Norm's counsel apprised the Hearing Officer of the 
same on three (3) separate occasions. R. 252, 280, 350-355. Unfortunately, neither the 
Hearing Officer or the USRB took any remedial steps to rectify this issue. 
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Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is correction of error 
with no deference to the USRB's decision because the due process claim involves a 
question of Constitutional law. See, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney at 28. 
Ill 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUES, AND RULES 
Pursuant to Rules 24(a)(6) and 24(a)( 11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Norm has concurrently submitted an Addendum that contains the following 
applicable constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules/procedures, to-wit: 
1. The pertinent Constitutional provisions are as follows: 
A. United States Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 1 
B. Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7 
The foregoing Constitutional provisions are attached as Exhibit A to the Addendum. 
2. Determinative Statutory Provisions: 
A. The "General Provisions" contained in the Utah State Retirement 
and Insurance Benefit Act (hereafter "USRIB A") , including the following 
highlighted/pertinent provisions; 
• (i) Utah Code Ann. §49-11 -101 et. seq. (2002) 
(ii) Utah Code Ann. §49-11-102(38) (2005) 
(iii) Utah Code Ann. §49-11-103(2) (2002) 
(iv) Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-203(l)(d) & (k) (2002) 
(v) Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401(3) (2005) 
(vi) Utah Code Ann. §49-11 -403 (2006) 
(vii) Utah Code Ann. §49-11 -607 (2003) 
(viii) Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613(7) (2005) 
The foregoing statutes are attached as Exhibit B to the Addendum. 
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B. The applicable statutory provisions from the Public Employees' 
Noncontributory System Act, including the following highlighted/pertinent provisions: 
(i) Utah Code Ann. §4943-102 (2006) 
(ii) Utah Code Ann. §49-13-201 (2005) 
(iii) Utah Code Ann. §49-13-302 (2002) 
(iv) Utah Code Ann. §49-13-402(2) (2005) 
The foregoing statutory provisions are attached as Exhibit C to the Addendum. 
3. The pertinent rules/procedures are as follows: 
A. Utah State Retirement Board Adjudicative Hearing Procedure 5(g) 
The foregoing Rule is attached as Exhibit D to the Addendum. 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Case Nature, Course, Proceedings and Disposition 
1. Nature of the Case: For the past fifteen (15) years, Norm has concurrently 
worked two full time positions2 with participating employers in the Utah State Retirement 
Systems (herein "the URS"). R. 109 -111, Norm's Exhibit 1 (R. 112 - 128), R. 383 p. 
131-135. Norm is sixty-two (62) years old and desires to retire with the full thirty-two 
2. Under the Public Employees' Noncontributory System codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§49-13-102, in the USRIBA, the Legislature has defined full time employment to: 
"requires an average of 20 hours or more per week, except as modified by the board, and 
who receives benefits normally provided by the participating employer." Utah Code Ann. 
§49-13-102(4)(a) (2006). The USRB does not dispute that both of Norm's positions are 
encompassed within the foregoing statutory definition of full time employment nor that 
Norm had5 in fact, actually earned the years of service credit he sought in his appeal 
below to the USRB. 
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(32)3 years of retirement service credit he has earned from his two (2) full time positions. 
R. 004-006; Respondent's Exhibit 4 (R. 158). The URS has determined, however, that 
only 17.087 of Norm's years of earned service credit are eligible for use in calculating his 
retirement benefit (thereby extinguishing/forfeiting 15.7084 of his years of earned service 
credit), even though the URS had previously made repeated representations to Norm that 
both of his full time positions were accruing full years of service credit under the 
USRIBA. R. 383 p. 134-144. 
2. Course of the Proceedings Below: On December 14, 2005, Robert V. 
Newman, Executive Director of the Utah State Retirement Office and in behalf of the 
URS, denied Norm's request to retire with 32.795 years of retirement service credit. R. 
003. Norm timely appealed to the USRB, which appointed Hearing Officer Richard C. 
Howe to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make Recommended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. R. 004, 049. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on 
July 14, 2006, Hearing Officer Howe issued his ruling on August 15, 2006 and upheld 
3. As of May 16, 2006, Norm had worked for the following employers and earned a total 
of 32.795 years of service credit: 
State of Utah 17.087 years of service credit 
West Point City 12.208 years of service credit 
Davis & Weber County 3.5 years of service credit 
Total 32.795 years of service credit 
See, Norm's Exhibit 4 (R. 141 - 144); Respondent's Exhibit 2 (R. 155); Respondent's 
Exhibit 4 (R. 158); R. 109 -110; R, 383 p. 82. 
4. The 15.708 figure represents Norm's total years of service credit that the URS has 
"forfeited" as of May 16, 2006. All references herein will refer to those forfeited years of 
earned service credit as of May 16, 2006, unless otherwise noted. 
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Mr. Newman's denial of Norm's request. R. 239, 241. The Hearing Officer signed 
Amended Recommended Findings of Facts [sic] and Conclusions of Law and Order on 
October 26, 2006,5 which were thereafter approved and signed by the USRB's Board 
President, John Lunt, on November 9, 2006. R. 370 - 378. 
3. Disposition Below: The USRB upheld the URS' denial of Norm's request 
to retire with the 32.795 years of earned and paid service credit. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. USRB's Decision and Findings of Fact: 
The findings of fact entered by Hearing Officer Howe and approved in the 
USRB's Decision are as follows: 
"1 . Petitioner is a member of the Public Employees Non-Contributory 
Retirement System ("PERS") due to his employment with the State of Utah ("State") and 
West Point City ("City"). Petitioner is also a member of the Public Employees 
5. The USRB's Decision is labeled as "Amended" because Respondent's counsel 
prepared an initial draft of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order that was 
objected to by Norm's counsel. R. 249 - 273; R. 274 - 323. Prior to preparing this 
Appellant's Brief, Norm and his counsel believed that the Amended Recommended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of October 26th were the only 
Findings, Conclusions or Order bearing the Hearing Officer's signature. Unbeknownst to 
Norm and his counsel and after reviewing the record, Norm and his counsel have now 
learned that Respondent's initial draft of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order were apparently submitted to Hearing Officer Howe on September 1, 2006 
(just one business day after a copy was e-mailed to Norm's counsel) and were signed by 
Hearing Officer Howe on September 1, 2006. R. 247, 249 - 273. The September 1, 2006, 
Findings, however, do not bear a signed certificate of mailing and the record does not 
reflect how these Findings were submitted to Hearing Officer Howe. The September 1, 
2006, Findings were not ultimately signed by the USRB and do therefore not constitute 
the final order of the USRB. 
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Contributory Retirement System ["PECRS"] due to his previous employment with Davis 
and Weber County Canal Agency ("County"). 
2. PERS and PECRS are administered by the Utah State Retirement Office 
(herein "the Retirement Office"). 
3. Petitioner began working for the State on April 15, 1989, and is currently an 
active employee. 
4. Petitioner began working for the City on January 1, 1994, and is currently 
an active employee. 
5. Petitioner was employed with the County from November 1, 1989, through 
April 30, 1993. Petitioner worked for a total of 3.5 years for the County. 
6. On September 14, 2005, the Retirement Office, at Petitioner's request, sent 
Petitioner an Estimate showing the calculation of his service credit. Petitioner's Estimate 
included a three year military service purchase. 
7. The Retirement Office sends out annual statements to all members who 
have contributions on record. The annual statements include total years worked for all 
participating employers. For example the statement sent out after the end of 2004 read in 
part as follows: 
"SERVICE CREDIT PER SYSTEM AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004 
CONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [ 1 ] 3.500 YEARS 
NONCONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [2] 10.834 YEARS 
NONCONTRIBUTORY STATE AND SCHOOL [2] 15.654 YEARS" 
"PLEASE EXAMINE THIS STATEMENT - If the balances shown on 
the accompanying statement are not correct, please write promptly giving 
details of any differences to our auditors, Deloitte & Touche, Attention: 
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URS, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt Lake City, UT 84144-0458, 
who are presently engaged in the regular examination of our financial 
statements. Correspondence should include your name, Social Security 
number, and a copy of this statement. If this statement is correct, no 
reply is necessary." (Emphasis in original). 
8. The following or a similar notification is contained on every annual 
statement sent out by the Retirement Office, "If you are a member in more than one 
Retirement System, if you are a part-time elected or appointed official, or if you are 
employed with two or more employers at the same time, you will need to contact the 
Retirement Office." 
9. Petitioner testified that in or about October 2003, he contacted the 
Retirement Office to request a retirement estimate. In November 2003, he received the 
retirement estimate notifying him that as of May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time 
employment, he would have a total of 17.087 years of service credit. 
10. Marcia Stroud, Retirement Advisor for the Retirement Office, testified that 
on August 29,2005, at Petitioner's request, she sent Petitioner a new retirement benefit 
estimate showing the calculation of Petitioner's retirement service credit. Different from 
the 2003 estimate, this estimate included a three-year service credit purchase for military 
service. The estimate showed that on May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time 
employment, Petitioner would have 20.087 years of service credit. 
11. Petitioner testified that on November 2, 2005, in a meeting with himself, 
Mr. Felshaw King, and Retirement Office employees Marcia Stroud and Chris Blevins. 
the Retirement Office clearly explained to Petitioner that he was not eligible for more 
than one year of service credit for one fiscal or calendar year of work. 
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12. Petitioner testified that he has not retired or terminated his employment 
with either the State or the City. 
13. Petitioner testified that had he known in 1994 that he could not count 
toward his retirement two years of service credit for each year that he worked for two 
employers, he would have accepted another position with West Point City, would have 
resigned has [sic] job with the State, and would have gone back to work in the 
construction industry with his brother as an appraiser and would have earned about 
$3,000 more per year. Petitioner provided no other evidence that he sustained injury or 
harm due to his reliance on the Retirement Office's annual statements." R. 370 - 373. 
II. Stipulated Findings of Fact:6 
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the parties reached a partial stipulation of facts 
that was signed by counsel for both parties and was made a part of the record which 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
"14. Petitioner has been employed with the following governmental entities: 
EMPLOYER YEARS EMPLOYED 
1. State of Utah April 15, 1989-Present 
2. Davis & Weber County Canal Co. November 1, 1989 - April 30, 1993 
3. West Point City January 1, 1994-Present 
15. Petitioner began working for the State of Utah on April 15,1989, and, is 
currently a merit employee with benefits that include retirement benefits that are paid to 
the URS in his behalf. The State of Utah has paid all contributions required by the PERS 
6. Although these facts were stipulated to by the parties, the Hearing Officer inexplicably 
did not include all of the stipulated facts in the Findings of Fact. 
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on Petitioner's behalf to the URS. 
16. Petitioner began working for West Point City on January 1, 1994, and, is 
currently a merit employee with benefits that include retirement benefits that are paid to 
the URS in his behalf. West Point City has paid all contributions required by the PERS 
on Petitioner's behalf to the URS. 
17. Petitioner was previously employed with the Davis and Weber County 
Canal Company from November 1, 1989, through April 30, 1993. The Petitioner and 
Davis and Weber County Canal Company have paid all contributions required by the 
PECRS on Petitioner's behalf to the URS." R. 109 - 112, R. 383 p. 7 -8. 
Ill, Additional Relevant Facts7: 
Norm submits the following record evidence is also germane, important and 
relevant to the issues before the Court: 
18. Marcia Stroud is Norm's Retirement Advisor at the URS and her 
undisputed testimony was that all necessary contributions have been paid to the URS by 
each of Norm's three (3) employers so as to qualify him for service credit for his 
employment with each of those employers8 totaling thirty-two (32) years of service credit. 
7. Each of the additional relevant facts numbered eighteen (18) through forty-two (42) 
were proposed by Norm in his Recommended Findings of Fact (R. 324-338) and 
Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (R. 274-323). Although the Hearing Officer denied Norm's objections and proposed 
Findings of Fact (R. 348-351), the Hearing Officer did not provide any analysis on insight 
as to the basis for denying Norm's objections that would be of any benefit to this Court in 
conducting a meaningful review on appeal. 
8. During the testimony of Mr. Whitaker, the Board's counsel also stipulated to that fact 
that Norm has been continuously employed by each of his employers and all necessary 
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R. 383 p. 74, 79 - 80, Respondent's Exhibit 4 (R. 158). Specifically: 
a. The State of Utah has paid all necessary contributions on Norm's 
behalf to the URS for Norm's 17.087 years of service credit as of May 16, 2006. R. 383 
p. 60, 65, 79 -80 , 133-134. 
b. West Point City has paid all necessary contributions on Norm's 
behalf to the URS for Norm's 12.208 years of service credit as of May 16, 2006. R. 383 
p. 60, 62 - 6 5 , 79 - 8 0 , 91. 
c. Norm and the County have jointly paid all necessary contributions 
on Norm's behalf to the URS for Petitioner's 3.5 years of service credit as of May 16, 
2006. R. 383 p. 79 - 80, 92, 133 - 134. 
19. During the cross-examination of Ms. Judy Lund, URS Retirement Director, 
she acknowledged that Norm had met all the statutory requirements of the USRIBA to 
receive approximately thirty-two (32) years of service credit. R. 383 p. (unavailable -
transcript incomplete). 
20. Norm testified that over the past five (5) years, he has received, retained, 
and relied on annual statements from the URS wherein he was advised by the URS that he 
had the following years of service credit incident to his employment, to-wit: 
"SERVICE CREDIT PER SYSTEM AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004 
CONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [ 1 ] 3.500 YEARS 
NONCONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [2] 10.834 YEARS 
NONCONTRIBUTORY STATE AND SCHOOL [2] 15.654 YEARS" 
See, Norm's Exhibit 2 at page 3 (R. 132); R 383 p. 137 - 138, 141 - 143. 
contributions have been paid by each of Norm's employers to qualify him for his 32.795 
years of earned service credit. R. 383 p. 133 - 134; R. 109 - 112. 
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21. On November 24, 2003, the URS mailed to Norm an Estimate showing the 
calculation of his service credit as totaling only 17.087 years. R. 383 p. 135-137, 
Respondent's Exhibit 2 (R. 155 - 156). The 2003 Retirement Estimate (showing only 3.5 
years of service credit, which was crossed out by Chris Blevins and 17.087 years was 
handwritten in) however, did not contain any statements regarding accuracy. See, R. 383 
p. 75 - 77; Respondent's Exhibit 2 (R. 155 - 158) and compare/contrast with Norm's 
Exhibit 2 (R. 130 - 137). Norm testified that based on the prior Annual Statements 
accurately showing his years of service, he believed the 2003 Retirement Estimate must 
have been a mistake so he took no further action at the time and continued to rely on the 
subsequent Annual Statements that showed service credit for all of his participating 
employers. R. 383 p. 135 - 137. Specifically, when Norm's 2004 Annual Statement 
showed an accurate amount of total years of service equaling 29.998 years of service 
credit, Norm believed that he had reasonably relied upon all of his prior Annual 
Statements from the URS that he was receiving service credit towards retirement for each 
of his jobs. See, Norm's Exhibit 2 at page 3 (R. 132), R. 383 p. 136 - 137, 144. 
Accordingly, and appropriately, Norm did not make any further inquiries of the URS until 
he was prepared to retire in the fall of 2005. R. 383 p. 138 - 139. 
22. When he called the Retirement Office in 2003, Norm testified he was 
verbally told to simply add his years of service credit together on his Annual Retirement 
Statement in order to determine his eligible years of service credit. R. 383 p. 143 - 144. 
23. When he received the Retirement Estimate in September of 2005 showing 
13 
only 20.086 years of service credit, Norm testified that he contacted his employers to 
confirm his years of service credit R. 383 p. 148 - 149. In of October 2005, Norm called 
Vee Gooch, Administrative Assistant to the Manager for the Davis and Weber County 
Canal Company (herein "the County"), to confirm he had received 3.5 years of service 
credit with the URS for his employment with the County as well as to confirm that the 
County had paid all required sums to the URS for his retirement. R. 383 p. 17-18. 
24. Ms. Gooch testified that Norm's Exhibit 3 (R. 138 - 140), was a true and 
correct copy of Norm's first and last paychecks which show retirement contributions were 
deducted from his paycheck for the 3.5 year time period. R. 383 p. 14-15 . 
25. Ms. Gooch testified that after speaking with a URS employee who 
identified herself as Donna Viganski verified that: 1) Norm had earned years of service 
credit for his employment with the County; 2) all required payments were paid into the 
retirement system for his 3.5 years of employment with the County; and, 3) that Norm 
had a total of "thirty something" years of service credit with the URS and was eligible to 
retire at anytime. R. 383 p. 17 - 18. Ms. Gooch testified that Donna did not tell Ms. 
Gooch that this service was "unverified." Ms. Gooch relayed the forgoing information to 
Norm. R.383p. 17-18. 
26. Ms. Gooch's unrebutted testimony was that she relies on the information 
contained in the URS' Annual Retirement Statements, identified as Norm's Exhibit 2, as 
being accurate in planning for her retirement. R. 383 p. 25. The URS did not challenge 
Ms. Gooch's reliance on her URS Annual Statements as being reasonable nor did they 
present testimony that contradicted Ms. Gooch's testimony. 
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27. Ms. Gooch, testified that she works one (1) full time job, funded by two (2) 
employers (Davis and Weber County Canal Co. and Weber River Water User's 
Association). Annually, each of Ms. Gooch's employers contribute only 50% of the sums 
necessary to purchase one (1) year of service credit in contradistinction to Norm's 
participating employers who have each paid/purchased one (1) year of service credit for 
each of Norm's jobs. R. 383 p. 18 - 49. Ms. Gooch further testified that her Annual 
Retirement Statement only shows 1.0 for a year of service because each of her employers 
only contribute 50% towards her retirement service credits in the contributory system, 
while Norm's Annual Retirement Statement shows 1.0 for each year of service credit in 
the Local Government Contributory System and an additional 1.0 year of service credit in 
the State and School Contributory System. See, Norm's Exhibit 2 (R. 130 -137); R. 383 
p. 24-26 . 
28. During the testimony of Marcia Stroud, she acknowledged that the 
information contained in each Annual Retirement Statement, as illustrated by Norm's 
Exhibits 1 and 2, is accurate and that members rely on the information contained in the 
Annual Retirement Statement. R. 383 p. 53. 
29. Rick Davis, West Point City Manager, and Tami Suzuki, West Point City 
Recorder and Human Resource Representative, each testified that in October, 2005, they 
spoke with URS' employee Marcia Stroud in a telephone conversation who confirmed 
that Norm had thirty-one (31) years of service credit and was eligible to retire any time. 
R. 383 p. 99-100, 108-109. 
30. In her testimony, Ms. Stroud testified that she only spoke to Mr. Davis and 
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not Ms. Suzuki and that a customer service technician can only give unverified years of 
service credit over the phone. R. 383 p. 49 - 50, 73. Ms. Stroud acknowledged during 
her testimony, however, that the URS subsequently "verified" Norm's thirty-two (32) 
years of service credit. R. 383 p. 51, 72 - 74, 79 - 80. 
31. Felshaw King, West Point City Attorney, testified that on October 25, 2005, 
he telephonically contacted the office of the URS and spoke with two (2) of URS' 
employees - a Donna (Mr. King had received her name from Ms. Gooch's conversation 
with Norm), who then transferred his call to Dustin Seeley. Upon inquiry, Mr. Seeley 
accessed Norm's records on his URS computer and stated to Mr. King that "he (Norm) 
has plenty of years. He has 31.495 years of service." R. 383 p. 119 - 120. Mr. King 
testified that Mr. Seeley did not tell Mr. King that the years of service were "unverified." 
Mr. King also testified that because Mr. Seeley had expressed to Mr. King that Norm had 
plenty of years of years to retire, Mr. King requested Mr. Seelev to send him written 
confirmation of his years of service credit. Mr. Seeley indicated that he could not send 
him written verification but that Norm would have to request a Retirement Estimate. R. 
383 p. 120. 
32. During the testimony of Mr. Seeley, he testified that he told Mr. King that 
Norm had earned "approximately thirty-one (31) years of unverified service." R. 383 p. 
38. 
33. During the testimony of Mr. King, he testified that based on the Annual 
Statements showing Norm was entitled to retire with thirty-one (31) years of service 
credit, he called and spoke with Chris Blevins and Marcia Stroud (URS personnel) to 
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inquire why Norm's 2005 Retirement Estimate only showed 20.087 years of service. R. 
383 p. 120-122. 
34. Mr. King testified that on November 2, 2005, he and Norm met with Ms. 
Blevins and Ms. Stroud in an attempt to clear up the confusion. During this conversation, 
and for the first time, URS personnel advised Norm that they believed he was not entitled 
to the full amount of service credit that he had earned during his employment with each of 
his employers. During this meeting, Ms. Blevins or Ms. Stroud acknowledged that even 
though the full contributions were paid by Norm's employer and received by the URS for 
each of Norm's jobs, Norm could only earn one (1) year of service credit in one (1) 
calendar year under the URS' interpretation of U.C.A. §49-1 l-403(c). Ms. Blevins and 
Ms. Stroud "agreed on everything, except the meaning and application of the statute." R. 
383 p. 121-122. 
35. Mr. King testified that during the November 2, 2005, meeting either Ms. 
Blevins or Ms. Stroud acknowledged that the URS "no longer sent out that kind of 
information on their statements" identified in Norm's Exhibits 1 and 2. R. 383 p. 121. 
36. During the testimony of Ms. Stroud, she acknowledged that Norm's 
situation is an unusual case and that she has not encountered another similar situation 
(involving more than one full time employer) before or after Norm's case. R. 383 p. 89. 
37. Mr. Seeley testified that he had not encountered a situation with more than 
one full time employer prior to Norm. R. 383 p. 47. 
38. During Ms. Lund's twenty-five (25) year career with the URS, she testified 
that there have "not been a handful" but "less than ten (10) employees," who had worked 
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two (2) full time positions during the same time period. Ms. Lund would not, however, 
identify or name any specific employees who were similarly situated to Norm. R. 383 p. 
(unavailable - transcript incomplete). 
39. Norm testified he understood and believed that his employment with West 
Point City, a full time position with benefits, and his employment with the Juvenile 
Courts, with the State of Utah, a full time position with benefits, each would individually 
count towards his years of service credit towards retirement. R. 383 p. 135-137. The 
Annual Statements Norm received confirmed Norm's understanding. R. 130 -138; R. 
383 p. 137-138. 
40. Without objection, Mr. King testified that when the URS accepted and 
"received credits and the payments from two employers, I would assume that your 
actuaries [the URS] would have taken that into account"... "assuming that your actuaries 
were functioning properly that they would have taken into account the fact that they were 
receiving benefits from two different employers for the same employee and that would 
have been factored into the system." R. 383 p. 124 - 126. 
41. On cross-examination and without objection, Mr. Davis testified that based 
on his prior experience in working as a Public Relations Director with Beneficial Life for 
six (6) years and as a fiscal performance auditor in the Office of the Auditor General for 
the State of Arizona for one and one-half (IV2) years, he opined that it would be illegal 
and immoral for the URS to accept two (2) premiums and pay one (1) benefit. R. 383 p. 
114. 
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42. During her testimony, Ms. Lund acknowledged the URS did not have any 
documentation or evidence from any URS actuary which would demonstrate any negative 
actuarial impact that might accrue in the event Norm were granted his full 32.795 years of 
service credit. R. 383 p. (unavailable - transcript incomplete). Additionally, neither Ms. 
Lund nor any other URS personnel requested the URS' actuary to perform any 
calculations to determine what actuarial impact would accrue, if any, in the event Norm 
received the full benefit of his 32.795 years of service credit. Ms. Lund further 
acknowledged that, if the URS actuary subsequently determined that granting Norm's 
requested relief were to create any actuarial soundness issue, the URS could then seek an 
increase in participating employer contributions from the Legislature to resolve the issue. 
R. 383 p. (unavailable - transcript incomplete). 
IV 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: In Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3)(a)(2005), the Legislature has clearly stated 
its intent that an employee "shall receive service credit for the term of employment 
provided that all contributions are paid to the office." It is undisputed that the URS has 
been paid all contributions required under the USRIBA and owed by Norm's employers. 
Despite the foregoing mandate and having been folly paid, the USRB nevertheless 
interpreted Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3)(c) to preclude Norm from receiving all of his 
years of earned service credit in reliance on the last sentence contained in Utah Code 
Ann. §49-1 l-401(3)(c): 
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"(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions 
apply: 
.. .(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per 
month, and per year upon the basis of which one year of 
service and proportionate parts of a year shall be credited 
toward qualification for retirement. Service may be computed 
on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served 
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all 
of the service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may 
not count for more than one year." Utah Code Ann. §49-11-
401(3)(c)(2005) (Emphasis supplied). 
Norm respectfully submits that the emphasized language in Utah Code Ann. §49-
1 l-401(3)(c)(2005) is ambiguous because it can reasonably be read in more than one 
fashion, to-wit: 1) Norm's Position: the statute should be liberally construed to allow for 
one (1) year of service credit to be earned in a one (1) year time period from "each 
employer"; 2) or the URS' Position: the statute should be narrowly interpreted and 
construed to be a limitation on an employee's ability to only earn one (1) year of service 
credit from "all employers" regardless of whether the employee (Norm) works two (2) 
full-time positions. Norm submits that his Position is consistent with the Legislature's 
intent that the USRIBA "shall be liberally construed to provided maximum benefits and 
protections consistent with sound fiduciary and actuarial principles." See, Utah Code 
Ann. 49-11-103 (2002). 
POINT II: It is undisputed that Norm worked twenty (20) or more hours per week for 
his second employer but these years of service credit are "ineligible" under the USRB's 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-401(3)(c)(2005). R. 109 - 12; R. 383 p. 60, 62 
- 65, 74, 79 - 80, 91, 133 - 134. Thus, under Utah Code Ann. §49-13-302 (2002), Norm 
20 
or his employer may purchase such "ineligible" service credit in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann. §49-11-403(3)(2006). Because Norm's second employer has (over the past 
fifteen (15) years) already paid the required contributions on Norm's behalf, Norm 
respectfully submits that this Court should determine those paid and received 
contributions satisfy the purchase requirement of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-403(3) (2006) 
thereby permitting him to retire with his full 32.795 years. 
Alternatively, 15.708 years of Norm's ineligible, but earned and paid, service 
credit should qualify as "forfeited" service credit under the USRIBA. Utah Code Ann. 
§49-11-403(l)(d) allows an employer or employee to purchase such forfeited service 
credit if the employee does not qualify for an allowance based on the service credit. 
Thus, the USRB erred by refusing to permit Norm to purchase his forfeited years of 
service credit. 
POINT III: In Eldredge v. Utah Sate Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), this Court adopted a three (3) part test a party must demonstrate to invoke the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel. Norm met the three part Eldredge test: 1) The URS made 
both written and oral representations to Norm which misled Norm to believe that he was 
receiving full years of service credit for each of his full time positions and the URS now 
inconsistently asserts that Norm is only entitled to receive years of service credit for one 
of his positions; 2) Norm reasonably relied on the Annual Statements he received from 
the URS, which showed that he was receiving full years of service credit for both of his 
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positions9 (R. 383 p. 135, 141); and 3) Norm will be substantially harmed by receiving a 
substantially reduced retirement benefit. 
POINT IV: The USRB failed to maintain an adequate record of the entire 
evidentiary hearing held below and therefore has deprived Norm of his due process right 
to effective appellate review by this Court. The transcript of the hearing is insufficient 
because (1) it does not contain the complete testimony of Judy Lund, Retirement Director 
for URS or any of Norm's counsel's cross-examination of Ms. Lund and (2) the quality of 
the tape is of extremely poor quality (the court reporter identifies over fifty (50) times that 
the testimony is "inaudible"). The failure to maintain an adequate record constitutes a 
violation of Norm's due process rights under United States Constitution Amendment 14, 
Section 1 and Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 7. See, West Valley City v. Roberts, 
1999 UT App 358, |14, 993 P.2d 252; Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 
23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 
9. See, Norman's Exhibits 1 and 2 (R. 112 - 137) attached as Exhibit I and J to the 
Addendum. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE USRB ERRED BY NARROWLY INTERPRETING 
UTAH CODE ANN. §49-11-401 (3)(c) & (e) IN A MANNER 
CONTRADICTORY TO THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT 
THAT THE USRIBA BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN 
FAVOR OF AWARDING MAXIMUM BENEFITS AND 
PROTECTIONS TO NORM. 
It is undisputed that Norm has lawfully earned over thirty-two (32) years of service 
credit under Section 49-11-401 (3)(a) of the USRIBA10, which mandates as follows: 
"(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following 
provisions apply:... 
(a) A person employed and compensated by a 
participating employer who meets the eligibility 
requirements for membership in a system or the Utah 
Governors' and Legislators' Retirement Plan shall11 
receive service credit for the term of the employment 
provided that all required contributions are paid to the 
office," Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-401 (3)(a)(2005) 
(emphasis supplied). 
The USRB's Decision held, however, that Section 49-1 l-401(3)(c) of the 
USRIBA, constitutes a limitation on the service credit that can be earned under Section 
49-11-403(a) in reliance on the last sentence of subsection (c), to-wit: 
... (c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, 
per month, and per year upon the basis of which one 
year of service and proportionate parts of a year shall 
10. See, Statements of Fact 18 (a-c), 19, 30, 32, and 42 hereinabove. 
11. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the word "shall" is presumed to be 
mandatory. See, Push v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, ^ 13,114 P.3d 546, 549 (Utah 2005), 
Paarv. Stubbs, 2005 UT App 310, f7, 117 P.3d 1079,1081. Thus, the URS has 
absolutely no discretion to ignore this requirement. 
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be credited toward qualification for retirement. Service 
may be computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and 
portions of years served shall be accumulated and 
counted as service. In any event, all of the service 
rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not 
count for more than one year." Utah Code Ann. §49-
1 l-401(3)(c) (2005) (Emphasis supplied). 
Norm respectfully submits, however, that the USRB's interpretation of Section 
401(3)(c) is inconsistent with, and contradictory to, the Legislature's intent that the 
USRIBA should be interpreted to maximize benefits: 
"49-11-103. Purpose - Liberal construction. 
(2) This title shall be liberally construed to provide 
maximum benefits and protections consistent with sound 
fiduciary and actuarial principals.12" (Emphasis supplied). 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that retirement statutes should be 
liberally construed in favor of the employee: 
"Furthermore, "pension statutes are liberally construed in 
favor of the pensioner." Id. at 431-32, 142 P.2d at 663. The 
interpretation defendants would have us give the language of 
the 1983 amendment is as confused and unreasonable as it is 
oppressive to plaintiff pensioners." Johnson v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 93, 98 (Utah 1988). 
12. No contradictory evidence was presented by the URS at the evidentiary hearing 
below that Norm's interpretation of the USRIBA is inconsistent with sound fiduciary and 
actuarial principles. The URS did not call any actuary as a witness at the evidentiary 
hearing below nor present any competent or written evidence that the USRB's 
interpretation of the USRIBA is consistent with sound actuarial principals. Significantly, 
Judy Lund could not identify any significant cost to the USRB if Norm were to receive 
his requested years of service credit nor did she consult with the URS' actuary on this 
issue. See, Statement of Fact No. 42 hereinabove; R. 383 p. (unavailable - transcript 
incomplete). 
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Ten (10) years later, in Justice Wilkins' dissent in O'Keefe v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 929 P.2d 1112, 1118 (Utah Ct.App. 1996)(cert granted, aff d on other 
grounds), 956 P.2d 279 (Utah 1998), he noted as follows: 
"The Utah State Retirement Act mandates that Title 49, which 
includes the PSRA, "shall be liberally construed to provide 
maximum benefits and protections." Id. § 49-1-102(2) 
(1994). Therefore, the plain language of the act requires that 
maximum benefits and protections be construed in favor of 
the system's beneficiaries. See Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. 
853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993) (" The primary rule of 
statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve.' " (quoting Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 
(Utah 1991))). Petitioner is among those beneficiaries." Id. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
For the reasons set fort below, Norm respectfully submits the USRB's 
interpretation of §401(3)(c) as a limitation on Norm's years of service credit for all 
employers is inconsistent with the clear legislative intent that the USRIBA is to be 
interpreted to provide the maximum possible benefits to participants such as Norm and 
therefore the USRB's interpretation should be rejected by this Court. 
A. The USRB has not Provided any Written Documentation that its Statutory 
Interpretation Promotes Uniformity or Actuarial Soundness and the USRB's 
Decision is Therefore Not Entitled to Deference 
In Sindt v. Retirement Board, 2007 UT 16, \ 5, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 71, the Utah 
Supreme Court has recently held the USRB's statutory interpretation of the USRIBA is 
reviewed under the correction of error standard in the absence of written documentation 
in the record demonstrating its interpretation promotes uniformity or actuarial soundness: 
"The legislature has granted discretion to the Board only if it 
"provides written documentation which demonstrates that the 
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interpretation or definition promotes uniformity in the 
administration of the systems or maintains the actuarial 
soundness of the systems, plans or programs." Id. Utah Code 
Ann. §49-l-203(l)(k) (2002). Additionally, courts will grant 
deference only if the Board's interpretation or definition is 
plausible and consistent with the plain language of the statute. 
In this case, the Board has not provided any documentation 
that its statutory interpretation promotes uniformity or 
actuarial soundness. Thus, the Board's decision is not entitled 
to deference. Absent a grant of discretion, we review the 
Board's application or interpretation of a statute as a question 
of law under the correction-of-error standard. Morton Int'l 
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581. 589 (Utah 1991)." 
Id. (Emphasis supplied). 
The USRB did not provide any competent evidence or written documentation in 
the record or during the evidentiary hearing below regarding uniformity or actuarial 
soundness as required in Sindt v. Retirement Board at f 5. The USRB's Decision and 
interpretation of the USRIBA is not entitled to any deference in these appellate 
proceedings. 
B. The Potential Statutory Limitation of §401(3)(c) Is Ambiguous and Should be 
Interpreted in Favor of Awarding Maximum Benefits in Behalf of Norm 
Norm respectfully submits that the potential13 statutory limitation regarding years 
13. The purported limitation of one (1) year of service credit per calendar/fiscal year is 
arguably inapplicable because Norm is not transferring years of service credit between 
systems. The purported limitations of §401(3)(c) applies to situations when the employee 
is transferring service credit between systems (e.g. from contributory to noncontributory 
or public safety). These situations are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar where, 
in a twelve (12) month time period, Norm worked two (2) full time jobs for two (2) 
employers; each employer is a participating employer in the noncontributory state system; 
and each employer paid the full retirement contribution to purchase one (1) year of 
service credit for a total of (2) years of service credit for every twelve (12) month time 
period. 
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of service credit contained in Utah Code Ann. §49-11-40 l(3)(c)14 of the USRIBA is 
ambiguous15 due to an omission in the last sentence that does not explicitly define 
whether the limitation applies to one (1) year of service credit from each employer or one 
(1) year of service credit from all employers. Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-401(3)(c) (2005) 
currently provides as follows: 
"(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions 
apply: 
.. .(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per 
month, and per year upon the basis of which one year of 
service and proportionate parts of a year shall be credited 
toward qualification for retirement. Service may be computed 
on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served 
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all 
of the service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may 
not count for more than one year." Utah Code Ann. 
§401(3)(c) (2005) (Emphasis supplied). 
14. Section 401(3)(e) has the same ambiguity, therefore the same analysis as to (3)(c) 
applies to (3)(e), to-wit: 
"A member may not accrue more than one year of service credit per fiscal 
or calendar year [for each employer] [for all employers] as determined by 
the office." Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3)(e). 
15. In Utah jurisprudence, a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one (1) 
logical meaning within the statutory scheme. See, Utah Public Employees Association v. 
State of Utah, 2006 UT 9,160, 131 P.3d 208; Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 
233 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). Further, where there is ambiguity in a statute, or it is 
susceptible to two (2) interpretations (one unconstitutional), the Court is bound to choose 
the interpretation which would uphold the statute as constitutional. See, Norville v. State 
TaxComrrfn, 97 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1940). It is evident that Section 401 (3)(c) can be 
read by reasonable persons with, at least, two (2) different meanings, and is therefore 
ambiguous. 
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Norm asserts that the emphasized last sentence in Section 401(3)(c) should be 
interpreted to apply to a Member's employment with each participating employer and 
would, thus, be interpreted as follows: 
"(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions 
apply: 
.. .(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per 
month, and per year upon the basis of which one year of 
service and proportionate parts of a year shall be credited 
toward qualification for retirement. Service may be computed 
on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served 
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all 
of the service rendered [for each employer] in any one fiscal 
or calendar year may not count for more than one year." 
(Bracketed language and emphasis supplied). 
Norm also posits that his interpretation is consistent with the Legislature's liberal 
construction mandate regarding the USRIBA because it provides the "maximum benefits" 
to Norm16 and is consistent with the USRIBA's statutory definition of service credit as 
accruing from one employer.17 
16. The USRB's interpretation of service credit completely deprives Norman of the 
benefit of over fifteen (15) years of service - when he gets to retire - and significantly 
reduces the amount he will receive when he retires. For example, Norm will suffer a nine 
percent (9%) reduction in his benefit if he retires at age sixty-two (62) under Utah Code 
Ann. §49-13-402(2)(b) (2005) because he does not have at least 30 years of service credit. 
Thus, the URS' refusal to recognize all of Norm's earned and paid years of service credit 
actually penalizes him twice - once for his loss of some 15.708 years of service credit and 
second for the actuarial reduction of nine percent (9%) he suffers under Utah Code Ann. 
§49-13-402(2)(b)(2005). 
17. The USRIBA defines service credit as employment with one employer, to-wit: 
"§49-11-102 ...(38) "Service credit" means 
(a) the period during which an employee is employed and compensated by 
a participating employer and meets the eligibility requirements for 
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Rather than properly factoring in the Legislature's mandate to "maximize benefits" 
for Norm, the USRB has instead taken a position that minimizes Norm's benefits by 
interpreting Section 401 (3)(c) as follows: 
"(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions apply: 
... (c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per 
month, and per year upon the basis of which one year of 
service and proportionate parts of a year shall be credited 
toward qualification for retirement. Service may be computed 
on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served 
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all 
of the service rendered [for all employers] in any one fiscal or 
calendar year may not count for more than one year." 
(Bracketed and emphasized language supplied). 
In this case, Norm submits the USRIBA's purpose is to "provide maximum 
benefits and protections"18 to Norm and this Court should so hold by rejecting the 
USRB's interpretation of §401(3)(c) because it improperly and unnecessarily limits 
Norm's "benefits and protections" under the USRIBA. Further, under Sindt v. 
Retirement Board at ^  5, the USRB has not demonstrated any actuarial soundness or 
uniformity premise which might potentially underpin its "minimizing" statutory 
membership in a system or the Utah Governors' and Legislators' Retirement 
Plan, provided that any required contributions are paid to the office; and 
(b) periods of time otherwise purchasable under this title." 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-102 (38) (2005) (Emphasis supplied). 
18. Furthermore, when a statute is ambiguous, the proper interpretation is the one which 
best harmonizes the statute's general purpose. UPEA v. State of Utah, at f 37 fh. 36 
quoting Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 80 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
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interpretation so as to overcome the Legislature's liberal construction mandate in favor of 
"maximizing benefits" to and for Norm. 
II 
THE USRB ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT UTAH 
CODE ANN. §49-ll-401(3)(C) DOES NOT EFFECT AN 
"INELIGIBLE" OR "FORFEITURE" STATUS 
REGARDING NORM'S 32,795 YEARS OF SERVICE 
CREDIT 
In the case at bar, the USRB is substantively requesting this Court to ignore the 
fact that all required contributions have been paid (for the corresponding years of service 
credit) on behalf of Norm such that he is statutorily eligible to receive over thirty-two 
(32) years of service credit under Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3)(a)(2005). By only 
accepting 17.087 years of Norm's earned service credit, however, the USRB is ignoring 
the provision of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-302(2002) in which the Legislature allowed for 
the purchase of years of service credit when an employee works twenty (20) or more 
hours per week for a participating employer but is not eligible for service credit based on 
that service. Thus, the USRB's Decision substantively effects a forfeiture of Norm's 
fifteen (15) years of service credit that he has earned and for which the URS has been 
fully paid by Norm's employers. 
A. The USRB Erroneously Determined that Norm Does not Have any Forfeited 
Credit 
In its Decision, the USRB determined that Norm does not have any forfeited 
service credit: 
"[Conclusion No.] 3. Petitioner is not entitled to 
purchase service credit under the provisions of Utah 
•0 
Code Ann. §49-11-403 because he has no forfeited 
service credit. 
[Conclusion No.] 4. All retirement contributions from 
all employers of the Petitioner received by the 
Retirement Office will be used in calculating his 
retirement benefit at the time he retires." R. 374. 
Although the USRB's conclusions of law are not factual findings requiring 
marshaling, as a matter of caution, Norm's counsel will marshal the evidence in support 
of the USRB's conclusions numbered 3 and 4 as follows: 
1. USRB Retirement Advisor Marcia Stroud and 
URS Retirement Director Judy Lund testified that the 
USRB combined Norm's salary from each of his 
current employers in computing his retirement benefit. 
R. 383 p. 61 - 63, 67, 79 - 82, 89-92, 162, 164-166; 
Respondent's Exhibit 4 (R. 158). 
2. Ms. Stroud testified that Norm will receive a 
"supplemental benefit" based on his 3.5 years of 
employment with Davis & Weber County Canal Co. 
because those years were in the Contributory System 
as opposed to being under the Noncontributory 
System. R. 383 p. 61, 92. 
For the reasons set forth in more detail in sections two (2) through four (4) 
hereinbelow, viewed in favor of the USRB's Decision, the marshaled evidence does not 
support the USRB's Conclusion that Norm has no forfeited service credit. 
B, Purchase of Non Qualifying Service Credit Under §49-13-302 of the USRIBA 
The Legislature has provided that when a Member works twenty (20) or more 
hours per week for a participating employer (but does not meet the other eligibility 
requirements for years of service credit), the Member may purchase those years of service 
credit: 
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"49-13-302. Purchase of service credit 
Any member who works 20 or more hours per week for a 
participating employer participating in this system, but does 
not meet other eligibility requirements for service credit, may 
purchase such service credit in accordance with Section 49-
11-403." Utah Code Ann. §49-13-302 (2002). 
The USRB's "minimizing" interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3)(c) 
prohibits Norm from accruing more than one (1) year of service credit in one (1) calendar 
year. Norm is thus ineligible for any year of service credit earned in his second full time 
position in the same calendar year. Norm is thus permitted under Utah Code Ann. §49-
13-302(2002) to purchase that "ineligible" service credit earned from his second full time 
position. 
To that end, the Legislature has (in the USRIBA) permitted a member (e.g., Norm) 
or a participating employer (e.g., the State of Utah and West Point City) to individually, 
separately or jointly purchase years of such "ineligible" service credit as follows: 
"49-11-403. Purchase of public service credit not 
otherwise qualifying for benefit. 
(3)(a) To purchase credit under this section, the member, a 
participating employer, or member and a participating 
employer jointly shall make payment to the system under 
which the member is currently covered. 
(b) The amount of the payment shall be determined by 
the office based on a formula that is: 
(i) recommended by the actuary; and 
(ii) adopted by the board...." 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-403(3) (2006) (Emphasis supplied). 
Inasmuch as the URS has already been folly paid for all of the years of service 
credit from both of Norm's foil time positions, Norm would respectfully request this 
Court determine that said circumstance constitutes a purchase of the foil service credits 
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under Section 49-11-403(3). Norm would then be entitled to implement that purchase by 
merely filling out any appropriate forms as may be required by the USRB under §49-11-
403 and, thereafter, be folly eligible to retire with his hard earned thirty-two (32) years of 
service credit. 
C. Purchase of Forfeited Service Credit 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court concludes Norm is precluded by Utah Code 
Ann. §49-l-401(3)(c) from including all of Norm's years of service credit in calculating 
his benefit, Norm submits he is also qualified to purchase these years of service credit as 
"forfeited credit."19 The USRB concluded below, as a matter of law, that Norm "has not 
forfeited service credit" because "all retirement contributions from all employers of the 
Petitioner received by the Retirement office will be used in calculating his retirement 
benefit at the time he retires." R. 374. (USRB Decision Conclusion no. 3 and 4). 
The fatal flaw to the USRB's legal conclusion is that it once again ignores the 
plain language of the retirement statute as follows: 
"49-11-403. Purchase of public service credit not 
otherwise qualifying for benefit. 
(1) A member, a participating employer, or a member and a 
participating employer jointly may purchase service credit 
equal to a period of the member's employment in the 
following: 
(d) forfeited service credit in this state if the member 
does not qualify for an allowance based on the service credit; 
19. It is well-established that forfeitures are generally not favored by the law. See, 
generally, Forsgren v. Sollie, 659 P.2d 1068, 1069 (Utah 1983); Russell v. Park City Utah 
Corp., 506 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1973). The Legislature obviously intended to rectify 
this fundamental unfairness by its enactment of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-403(1) (2006) 
that allows the purchase of "forfeited" years of service credit. 
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... Utah Code Ann. §49-11-403(1) (2006) (Emphasis 
Supplied). 
Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-403(l)(d) provides that forfeited service credit may be 
purchased for years of service credit "if the member does not qualify for an allowance 
based on the service credit/'20 (Emphasis supplied) Although Norm may receive some 
partial benefit based on his combined salary, he is certainly not receiving any 
allowance/benefit based on the 15.708 of his years of earned service credit from his 
second full time position and those forfeited years of service credit should therefore 
qualify under Section 49-1 l-403(l)(d) to be purchased by Norm and/or his employer(s). 
This much cannot be disputed by the USRB - Norm has worked at two (2) full 
time positions for two (2) participating employers but the USRB will only recognize his 
years of service credit for one (1) of his employers. Thus, since both of Norm's full time 
positions have resulted in the accrual of years of service credit under Utah Code Ann. § 
49-11-401 (3)(a) (2005),21 Norm submits the USRB cannot logically assert that Norm's 
years of service credit from his second full time position have been forfeited by the 
USRB. Moreover, but for the USRB's "minimizing" interpretation §401(3)(c), Norm 
would be entitled to 32.795 years of service credit for the work performed on behalf of 
each of his employers. 
20. Therefore the USRB's partial factoring of Norm's salary from both of his current 
employers is irrelevant to the issue of how many years service credit have been forfeited 
because there is no mention of salary or final average salary in the purchase of service 
credit statute. 
21. See, page 23 hereinabove for the entire text of this subsection. This subsection is 
also set forth and highlighted in Exhibit B to the Addendum. 
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D. The USRB's Windfall 
Since the USRB has received all required contributions from Norm's employers as 
required under § 49-1 l-401(3)(a) for Norm's thirty-two (32) years of service credit and the 
USRB has not refunded any excess contributions received from either of Norm's employers, 
Norm submits the same constitutes an admission by the USRB that there are no errors regarding 
the accrual of Norm's years of service credit or the payment of his employers' contributions. If 
there had been an error, the USRB would most certainly have honored its fiduciary duties by 
returning Norm's employers' overpayment of contributions in his behalf has provided in the 
USRIBA: 
"49-11-607. Determination of benefits-Errors in records 
or calculations - Correction of errors by the office, 
(3).. .(c) If excess contributions have been received by 
the office, the contributions shall be refunded to the 
participating employer or member which paid the 
contributions." Utah Code Ann. §49-1 K607f3Vri T2003) 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Thus, refusing to credit Norm with his full years of service credit based on the 
USRB's receipt of full employer contributions or returning those contributions paid by 
West Point City and the State of Utah for which no benefits will ever be paid to Norm or 
anyone else, the USRB has obtained a windfall benefit and the excess contributions it has 
received from Norm's employers are simply absorbed into the PECRS. Norm, on the 
other hand, will suffer a nine percent (9%) actuarial reduction22 in his monthly retirement 
22. See, Utah Code Ann. §49-13-402(2)(b) (2005), which imposes a three percent (3%) 
penalty for each year an employee is under the age of sixty-five (65), if he/she has less 
than thirty (30) years of service credit. If Norm received his full years of service credit, 
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benefit that results in his only receiving a retirement benefit equal to twenty-five percent 
(25%)23 of his final average salary instead of the sixty-four percent (64%) monthly 
allowance he should receive from his hard earned work for his employers. 
Ill 
THE USRB ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT 
EQUITABLE ESTOPEL DOES NOT APPLY IN 
THIS CASE 
A. Challenged Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Estoppel 
Appellate review of the USRB's application of the facts to the legal standard of 
equitable estoppel is a mixed question of fact and law which is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion with deference afforded to the factual findings of the USRB.24 Norm 
challenges the following factual findings and conclusions of law contained in the USRB's 
Decision: 
Finding of Fact No. 13: 
"Petitioner testified that had he known in 199 A that he could not 
he would not suffer this actuarial penalty. 
23. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §49-12-402(2)(a)(ii) (2005) and §49-13-402(2)(a) 
(2002), Norm's retirement benefit is calculated by multiplying two percent (2%) by the 
years of service credit and multiply that number by the employee's final average monthly 
salary. Norm's thirty-two (32) years of service credit thus qualify him for a benefit equal 
to sixty-four percent (64%) of his final average salary. However, by the USRB's 
calculations, Norm will only receive a benefit by multiplying two percent (2%) times 
17.087 years of service credit resulting in a total of thirty-four percent (34%) of Norm's 
final average salary that is reduced by a nine percent (9%) actuarial deduction (see, 
footnote 22) for a twenty-five percent (25%) benefit of his final average salary rather than 
a benefit equal to sixty-four percent (64%) of his final average salary. 
24. See, Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct.App. 1994); 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991); Eldredge v. 
Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 674-5 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
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count toward his retirement two years of service credit for each year 
that he worked for two employers, he would have accepted another 
position with West Point City, would have resigned his job with the 
State, and would have gone back to work in the construction industry 
with his brother as an appraiser and would have earned about 
$3,000.00 more per year. Petitioner provided no other evidence that 
he sustained injury or harm due to his reliance on the Retirement 
Office's annual statements."25 R. 372 - 373. 
Conclusion No. 6: 
"Even if Petitioner could have proven an "unusual circumstance" 
against the Board, Petitioner failed to prove sufficient grounds to 
prevail on any claim for equitable estoppel against the Board. The 
elements of equitable estoppel are: 
(1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or 
inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's 
statement, admission, act or failure to act; and (3) injury to the 
second party that would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to 
act. 
Holland v. Career Service Review Bd, 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App, 
1993)." R. 374. 
Conclusion No. 7: 
"Although Petitioner misunderstood when he would be able to retire, 
the undisputed facts do not give rise to an unusual circumstance to 
prevail on an estoppel claim against the Retirement System. None of 
the annual statements gave Petitioner a "total" amount of his service 
credit and each statement advised him to contact the Retirement 
Office if he was employed by two or more employers at the same 
time. Because he failed to do so, his reliance on his interpretation of 
the amounts on the annual statements was not reasonable, and he did 
not suffer any damage because of any reliance. 
When Petitioner first contacted the Retirement Office in 2003, he 
was correctly told that he would have 17.087 years of service credit 
as of May 16,2006. Petitioner failed to contact the Retirement 
25. Petitioner only challenges the underlined portions of the disputed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
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Office again until September 2005 when he requested another 
estimate with a three year military purchase. Petitioner was then told 
that he would have 20.087 years of service credit as of May 16, 
2006, if he made a military service purchase. Although Petitioner 
was verbally informed in mid-October 2005 by a Retirement Office 
customer service representative that he had over 31 years of 
"unverified" service credit, the Retirement Office quickly corrected 
such a statement, and on November 2, 2006, the Retirement Office 
clearly informed Petitioner that he could not receive more than one 
year of service credit for one year of actual work. 
These facts do not rise to the level of an "unusual circumstance" to 
create an estoppel against the Board as a governmental entity. 
Further, Petitioner proved no reasonable reliance on the Board's 
statements, nor did he prove damages to prevail on a claim for 
estoppel against the Board. Therefore, there are insufficient grounds 
to support an estoppel against the Board." R. 374 - 375. 
Before addressing the elements of estoppel, Norni will marshal the evidence 
supporting the USRB's Decision regarding estoppel as follows: 
1. On November 24, 2003, the URS sent Norm an Estimate 
showing the calculation of his service credit as of May 16, 2006, 
totaling only 17.087 years. R. 383 p. 55 - 56, 74 - 77, 86, 136; 
Respondent's Exhibit's 1 and 2 (R. 154 - 156). Norm received the 
2003 Retirement Estimate, which he believed to be inaccurate but 
did not contact the URS again until 2005. R. 383 p. 145 - 146. 
2. On September 14, 2005, the URS, at Norm's request, sent 
Norm a Retirement Estimate showing an estimate of his retirement 
benefits based on calculation of his service credit. The 2005 
Retirement Estimate included a three year military service purchase 
but showed only 20.087 years of service credit contrary to Norm's 
2004 Annual Retirement Statement. R. 383 p. 77 - 80; Norm's 
Exhibit 4 (R. 141 - 144); Respondent's Exhibit 3 (R. 157). 
3. Marcia Stroud, Norm's Retirement Benefits Advisor for the 
URS, testified that in 2005 she only spoke to Rick Davis about Mr. 
Whitaker and that she was "certain" she never spoke with Ms. 
Suzuki. Further, Ms. Stroud testified that she informed Mr. Davis 
that Norm did not have enough service credits for thirty-one (31) 
years of service credit based on the 2003 estimate. R. 383 p. 93. 
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4. Dustin Seeley, Retirement Advisor for the URS, testified that 
in 2005 he did not tell Mr. King that Norm had "plenty of years" to 
retire but that Mr. Whitaker had "unverified service of approximately 
thirty-one (31) years." R. 383 p. 38 - 39. 
5. On November 2, 2005, Mr. King and Norm met with URS 
employees, Chris Blevins (Ms. Stroud's supervisor at URS), and Ms. 
Stroud in an attempt to clear up the confusion. During this 
conversation, Ms. Blevins and Ms. Stroud advised Norm that they 
believed he was not entitled to the full amount of service credit that 
he had earned during his employment with each of his employers. 
During this meeting, Ms. Blevins or Ms. Stroud expressed that even 
though the full contributions were made and received for each of 
Norm's jobs, under the URS' interpretation of U.C.A. §49-11-
401(3)(c), Norm could only earn one (1) year of service credit in one 
(1) calendar year. As Mr. King testified, Ms. Blevins and Ms. 
Stroud "agreed on everything, except the meaning and application 
of the statute." Although Mr. King tried to explain to URS personnel 
that he believed they were relying on a statute that was inapplicable 
to Norm's circumstances, they were adamant in their position and 
refused to discuss potential resolution of the matter. R. 383 p. 69 -
70,120-122. 
6. The Annual Statements sent out by the Retirement Office 
include total service for each of Norm's employers but do not add up 
each of Norm's employer's totals such that they do not provide a 
grand total number of years of service credit. R. 383 p. 117, Norm's 
Exhibit 2 (R. 130-137). 
7. The Annual Statements sent out by the Retirement Office 
include the following notification: 
"To determine a monthly allowance estimate go to the Utah 
Retirement System web site at www.urs.org and click on the 
Retirement Benefit Estimate Calculator link. Follow the guides and 
use information from this and previous statements to determine an 
estimated allowance. 
If you are a member in more than one Retirement System, if you are 
a part-time elected or appointed official, or if you are employed with 
two or more employers at the same time, you will need to contact the 
Retirement Office." (Emphasis supplied) Norm's Exhibit 2 (R. 130 
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-137); R. 383 p. 53. 
For the reasons set forth in more detail in Section "B" hereinbelow, viewed in 
favor of the USRB's Decision, the marshaled evidence does not support the USRB's 
Decision that the facts are insufficient to create an estoppel against the USRB. 
B. The Facts Warrant the Application of Estoppel Against the USRB in Favor of 
Norm 
1. Estoppel is Appropriate Against the USRB as a Governmental Agency 
Acting in a Proprietary Capacity 
The elements of equitable estoppel are: 
"The elements essential to invoke equitable estoppel are: (1) a 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action 
or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first 
party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) 
injury to the second party that would result from allowing the 
first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act. CECO Corp. v. Concrete 
Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989); Celebrity 
Club, 602 P.2d at 694; Utah Dep 't of Transp. v. Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988)." Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board. 795 P.2d 
671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
As a general rule, the Utah Courts have held that equitable estoppel may only be invoked 
against the State where it is in the interests of justice to do so and have imposed a more 
stringent test applicable to governmental agencies: 
"As a general rule under case law, the doctrine of estoppel is 
not assertable against the state and its agencies. Utah State 
Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). Utah 
courts have, however, carved out an exception to this general 
common law rule in unusual circumstances "where it is plain 
that the interest of justice so require." Id. at 720; see, e.g., 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm 'n, 602 
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P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). "In cases where such an issue arises, 
the critical inquiry is whether it appears that the facts may be 
found with such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of 
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Utah State Univ., 
646P.2dat720." Id. 
In Eldredge, this Court held, however, that the USRB has a duty to refrain from giving 
inaccurate or misleading information:26 
"Two other considerations not present in Celebrity Club 
strengthen Eldredge's case for estoppel. The critical nature 
of the irrevocable, once-in-a-lifetime retirement decision of a 
public employee imposes a strict duty of certitude upon those 
charged with the supervision and implementation of the 
system. "[A1 governmental body, charged with as important 
a function as the administration of a public employees 
retirement system, bears a most stringent duty to abstain 
from giving inaccurate or misleading advice." Nevada 
Public Employees Retirement Bd. v. Byrne, 96 Nev. 276, 607 
P.2d 1351, 1353 (1980)." Id. at 676. (Emphasis supplied). 
In Eldredge, Judge Jackson further opined that the less stringent equitable estoppel test 
applicable to individuals governs disputes between the USRB and its members: 
"In addition, as noted in Celebrity Club, 602 P.2d at 694, 
the courts must be more cautious in applying equitable 
estoppel against the State when it is functioning in a 
governmental, as opposed to a proprietary, capacity. Here, 
the fUtah State Retirement] Board was exercising a 
26. The USRB had not heretofore disputed that it has a duty to refrain from giving 
inaccurate or misleading information or that it acts in a proprietary manner and the Utah 
Courts will apply a less stringent equitable estoppel test. See, Eldredge v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 675-7 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) The USRB determined in 
Conclusion Number 7 that the Board is a governing entity and the facts do not rise to the 
level of "unusual circumstances." In light of Eldredge, the higher standard of estoppel 
against governmental entity does not apply. Nonetheless, Norm also meets the higher 
standard of estoppel against governmental entities acting in a governmental capacity that 
there must be unusual circumstance is also met and will be addressed in more detail in 
section five (5) hereinbelow. 
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proprietary function, so less caution is required. "It must 
be remembered that when the State functions in its 
propriety capacity, it will receive no better treatment than 
any two private individuals who bring their dispute before 
the courts for final resolution." Metropolitan Park Dist V, 
Department of Natural Res., 85 Wash.2d 821, 539 P.2d 
854, 859 (1975)." Id. at 676-677. (Emphasis supplied). 
2. URS9 Written Representations & Norm's Reasonable Reliance 
Norm reasonably relied on the Annual Retirement Statements that he received 
from the URS. The USRB's Conclusion number seven (7) notes that, "None of the 
annual statements gave Petitioner [Norm] a total amount of service credit" is erroneous. 
Norm's Exhibit 2 is an example of the Annual Retirement Statements that the URS sent 
to Norm on an annual basis. (See, Exhibit J to the Addendum). On two (2) different 
sections of the Annual Retirement Statement, the URS shows that Norm is accruing full 
years of service credit for each of his employers. 
First, on the third page of the 2004 Annual Statement (Norm's Exhibit 2 - R. 132 -
Exhibit J to the Addendum), on the right hand side, in the left column, it identifies that 
Norm earned "total service" in 2004 under the "Noncontributory System Local 
Government," of "1.000." The right column identifies that Norm earned "total service" in 
2004 under the "Noncontributory System State and School," of "1.000." Simply 
"adding" the total service in each of the systems, Norm accrued "2.000" years of total 
service in 2004. 
Second, the total service is further supported by the "service credit per system as 
of December 31, 2004," included on the same page of the 2004 Annual Statement 
(Norm's Exhibit 2 - R. 132) in the left had column which shows: 
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"SERVICE CREDIT PER SYSTEM AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004 
CONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [1] 3.500 YEARS 
NONCONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [2] 10.834 YEARS 
NONCONTRIBUTORY STATE AND SCHOOL [2] 15.654 YEARS" 
See, Norm's Exhibit 1 and Norm's Exhibit 2 at page 3, attached as 
Exhibit I and J to the Addendum and which is incorporated 
herein by this reference. R. 132, R 383 p. 141 - 143, 
p. 149-151. 
For the past five (5) years, Norm has received, retained, and relied on annual 
statements from the URS wherein he was advised by the URS that he was earning years 
of service credit for each of his qualifying full time positions and had received the 
foregoing years of service credit incident to his employment. See, Norm's Exhibit 2 at 
page 3 (R. 132); R. 383 p. 137 - 138, 141 - 143. Upon review of those Annual 
Statements, Norm submits those Annual Statements demonstrate he was accruing years of 
service credit with each of his employers. 
The USRB's conclusion that Norm should have contacted the Retirement Office is 
flawed for three (3) reasons. First, Norm testified that he contacted the URS in 2003 and 
was told to simply "add up" all of the years of service. R. 383 p. 143 - 144. This is 
consistent with the telephonic discussion between personnel of Norm's employers (Vee 
Gooch, Tami Suzuki, and Rick Davis) as well as West Point City Attorney Felshaw King 
when they contacted URS in 2005. Significantly, each independently testified he/she was 
informed by the URS that Norm had "over thirty (30) years of service credit" and "had 
plenty of years to retire."27 R. 383 p. 17 - 18, 99 - 100, 108 - 109, 119 - 120. Further, 
27. Although the URS put on evidence by URS employees Ms. Stroud and Mr. Seeley 
that they qualified their representations that Norm had thirty-one (31) years of 
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Dustin Seeley and Marcia Stroud admitted that the questionnaire that URS Customer 
Service personnel use when employees call in, does not include a question regarding 
whether the employee has more than one (1) employer. R. 383 p. 44, 87; Respondent's 
Exhibit 1 and 3 (R. 154, 155). Thus, even when an employee calls the URS pursuant to 
the URS5 instruction on the Annual Statements, the employee is not provided with 
accurate information because he (Norm in this case) is not informed about the purported 
"minimizing" limitation contained in Utah Code Ann. 49-1 l-401(3)(c)(2005). 
Second, the following language that the USRB relies on in the Annual Statements, 
is inapplicable: 
"To determine a monthly allowance estimate go to the Utah 
Retirement System web site at www.urs.org and click on the 
Retirement Benefit Estimate Calculator link. Follow the 
guides and use information from this and previous statements 
to determine an estimated allowance. 
If you are a member in more than one Retirement System, if 
you are a part-time elected or appointed official, or if you are 
employed with two or more employers at the same time, you 
will need to contact the Retirement Office." Norman's 
Exhibit 2 at p. 3; Addendum Exhibit J (R. 132) (emphasis 
supplied). 
The USRB has taken this language out of context. The instruction to contact the 
Retirement Office, "if you work with two or more employers at the same time," is in relation to 
"unverified" service, the issue of whether the service was verified or was unverified is 
irrelevant and a red herring for two (2) reasons. First, Ms. Stroud testified the she 
ultimately verified Norm's years of service credit. R. 383 p. 51, 72 - 74, 79 - 80. 
Second, the issue is not whether Norm actually performed the necessary work to accrue 
the earned years of service credit at issue (which is undisputed), the issue is whether the 
USRB is estopped from denying Norm his years of service credit based on its written and 
oral misrepresentations. 
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determining a member's estimated monthly allowance by using the URS website online 
calculation, not whether the member's reported years of service credit are accurate or how to 
calculate accrued years of service credit. 
Third, the URS' Annual Statement instructs a member to contact the auditor only if the 
information is inaccurate, and to do nothing if the information is accurate, to-wit: 
"PLEASE EXAMINE THIS STATEMENT - If the 
balances shown on the accompanying statement are not 
correct, please write promptly giving details of any 
differences to our auditors, Deloitte & Touche, Attention: 
URS, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt Lake City, UT 
84144-0458, who are presently engaged in the regular 
examination of our financial statements. Correspondence 
should include your name, Social Security number, and a 
copy of this statement. If this statement is correct, no reply 
is necessary." (Bold in original) (Underlining emphasis 
supplied) See, Norm's Exhibit 2 at page 2; Addendum 
Exhibit J. 
Moreover, the USRB's reliance on the 2003 Retirement Estimate does not vitiate 
Norm's reasonable reliance on the URS Annual Statements mailed to him because the 
2003 Retirement Estimate28 (showing only 3.5 years of service credit, which was crossed 
out by Chris Blevins and 17.087 years was handwritten in) did not contain any statements 
28. The USRB's reliance on the 2003 Retirement Estimate does not remedy the URS' 
prior misrepresentations contained in the preceding Annual Statements because the URS 
did not "correct" this alleged "error." First, Norm's 2004 Annual Statement should have 
shown fewer years of service credit then are shown on Norm's 2003 Annual Statement. 
Assuming arguendo, that the USRB's argument regarding the 2003 Retirement Estimate 
would be persuasive to this Court, Norm submits that Estimate loses its persuasiveness in 
light of the alleged "inaccurate" 2004 and 2005 Annual Statements the URS subsequently 
mailed to Norm. Under Eldredge, the URS has a "strict duty of certitude... to abstain 
from giving inaccurate or misleading advice." Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board 
at 657. The transcript is clear that URS personnel did not comply with this duty under 
Eldredge as applied to Norm's circumstances. 
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regarding accuracy. See, R. 383 at p. 136- 137. Respondent's Exhibit 2 (R. 155 - 156) 
and compare/contrast with Norm's Exhibit 2 (R. 130 — 131). Based on the prior Annual 
Statements accurately showing Norm's years of service, Norm reasonably believed the 
2003 Retirement Estimate must be a mistake, took no further action at the time, and 
continued to rely on the subsequent Annual Statements that showed his full years of 
service credit for all of his participating employers. R. 383 p. 135-137. Specifically, 
when Norm's 2004 Annual Statement showed an accurate amount of total years of 
service equaling 29.998 years that deviated from the 2003 Retirement Estimate, Norm 
reasonably relied upon this 2004 Annual Statement and all of his prior Annual Statements 
from the URS that he was receiving service credit towards retirement for each of his jobs. 
See, Norm's Exhibit 2 (R. 131). Accordingly, and appropriately, Norm did not make any 
further inquiries of the URS until he was ready to retire in the fall of 2005. R. 383 p. 135 
-137,144. 
URS personnel have actual knowledge that its Members, including Norm, 
routinely rely on the Annual Statements. In fact, Marcia Stroud, Norm's Retirement 
Advisor with the URS, testified that the information contained in the Annual Retirement 
Statement (as identified in Norm's Exhibits 1 and 2 and as set forth in Exhibits I and J in 
the Addendum) as accurate and that Members rely on the information contained in these 
statements. R. 383 at p. 52 - 53. Ms. Vee Gooch also testified that she, in fact, relies on 
the information contained in the URS Annual Statements she has received as being 
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accurate in planning for her retirement years. R. 383 p. 25. 
3, URS' Oral Representations & Norm's Reasonable Reliance 
Ms. Gooch provided Norm's personnel file (submitted as Norm's Exhibit 3 R. 138 
- 140), including a copy of Norm's first and last paychecks which show retirement 
contributions were deducted from his paycheck. R. 383 p. 14-15. After speaking with a 
URS employee who identified herself as Donna,30 Ms. Gooch testified that she informed 
Norm "Donna" verified that: 1) Norm had earned years of service credit from his 
employment with the Davis and Weber County Canal Company (the County); 2) all 
required payments were paid into the retirement system for his 3.5 years of employment 
with the County; and, 3) that Norm had a total of "thirty something" years of service 
credit with the URS and was eligible to retire at anytime. R. 383 p. 17 -18. Ms. Gooch 
testified that she was not told that this service was "unverified" by Donna. R. 383 p. 17 -
18. 
Both Rick Davis, West Point City Manager, and Tami Suzuki, West Point City 
Recorder and Human Resource Representative, spoke by telephone with URS employee 
Marcia Stroud (in October of 2005) in which Ms. Stroud confirmed that Norm then had 
thirty-one (31) years of service credit and was eligible to retire at any time. R. 383 at p. 
99 - 100, 107 - 109. Although Ms. Stroud testified that she only spoke to Mr. Davis and 
29. The URS did not challenge Ms. Gooch's reliance on her URS Annual Statements as 
being reasonable nor did they present testimony that contradicted Ms. Gooch's testimony. 
30. Although Donna Viganski, an account analyst with the URS, was identified as the 
only Donna working at URS at this time, she testified that she did not recall speaking 
with Ms. Gooch, or anyone else, regarding Norm. R. 383 at p. 11 - 13. 
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not Ms. Suzuki and that a customer service technician can only give "unverified" years of 
service credit over the phone (R. 383 p. 49 - 50, 73), she acknowledged that the URS had 
subsequently "verified" Norm's thirty-one (31) years of service credit. R. 383 at p. 74. 
Felshaw King, West Point City Attorney, and a practicing attorney for forty-four 
(44) years, testified that he telephonically contacted the office of the URS on October 25, 
2005, and spoke with two (2) of URS' employees - a Donna (Mr. King had received her 
name from Ms. Gooch's conversation with Norm), who then transferred him to Mr. 
Dustin Seeley. R. 383 at p. 118-119. Upon request, Mr. Seeley accessed Norm's 
records on his URS computer and stated to Mr. King that "he (Norm) has plenty of years. 
He has 31.495 years of service." R. 383 at p. 119 - 120. Because Mr. Seeley had 
expressed to Mr. King that Norm had "plenty of years" to retire, Mr. King requested Mr. 
Seeley to send him written confirmation of Norm's years of service credit. R. 383 at p. 
119 - 120. Mr. Seeley indicated that he could not send him written verification to MR. 
King but that Norm would instead have to request a Retirement Estimate. R. 383 at p. 
120. 
Mr. Seeley testified that he did not tell Mr. King that Norm had "plenty of years" 
to retire but did admit that he informed Mr. ICin that Norm had "approximately thirty-one 
(31) years of unverified service." R. 383 p. 38, 119 - 120. However, Mr. King testified 
that Mr. Seeley never used the term "unverified" during their discussion. R. 383 p. 38, 
119-120. 
4. Norm's Detrimental Reliance 
In Finding of Fact number 13, The USRB determined that Norm relied on the 
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Annual Retirement Statements issued to him showing he had plenty of years to retire with 
over thirty (30) years of service. Finding number 13 supports Norm's testimony that he 
was consistently led to believe by the URS that he was earning years of service credit for 
both of his full time positions. Moreover, Norm testified that had he known in 1994 that 
both of his positions would not count towards his years of service credit, then he would 
have accepted the job with West Point City, but he would have resigned his job with the 
State of Utah. Instead, he would have returned to work in the construction industry with 
his brother as an appraiser and would have earned approximately $3,000 more per year. 
Finding of fact no. 13; R. 372 - 373; R. 383 p. 150 - 152. Norm also testified that he had 
earned seven hundred and seventy-seven (777) hours of sick leave that he would have 
been able to cash out had he been allowed to retire as requested in October of 2005. R. 
383 at p. 140-141. 
5. Unique Circumstances Involving Norm 
The USRB held that Norm's circumstances are not unique as required to prove an 
estoppel against a governmental agency: 
Conclusion of Law No. 5. 
"As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a 
governmental entity. In Utah, there is a limited exception to 
this general principal for 'unusual circumstances' 'where it is 
plain that the interests of justice so require.' This exception 
applies, however, only if 'the facts may be found with such 
certainty, and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to 
invoke the exception.' Anderson v. Public Service Comm'n, 
839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(citations omitted)." R. 374. 
Norm's circumstance is unique because the Annual Retirement Estimates Norm 
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received and relied on (showing that his thirty-two (32) years of service credit were not a 
mere wish or belief) are no longer sent to employees by the URS. R. 383 p. 121. Second, 
the USRB did not present evidence of any other specific individuals similarly situated to 
Norm. Ms. Stroud testified that Norm's situation is an unusual case and that (in her seven 
(7) years with the URS) she has not encountered another situation with more than one full 
time employer either before or after Norm's case. R. 383 at p. 55. Mr. Seeley also 
testified that he has not encountered a situation with more than one full time employer 
prior to Norm. R. 383 p. 47. Ms. Lund testified that during her twenty-five (25) year 
career, there have "not been a handful," "less than ten (10) employees," who had worked 
two (2) full time jobs during the same time period. R. 383 p. (unavailable - transcript 
incomplete). Significantly, Ms. Lund did not identify any specific employees who may 
have been in similar situations to Norm. And, more importantly, the USRB presented no 
actuarial basis that would overcome the Legislative intent that the USRIBA be interpreted 
to provide Norm with the maximum benefits he is entitled to receive in this matter. In 
sum, Norm's case is unique because it is the only case of its kind. 
IV 
NORM'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
BY THIS COURT HAS BEEN ABRIDGED BY THE 
USRB'S FAILURE TO PRESERVE AN AUDIBLE AND 
COMPLETE TRANCRIPT OF THE EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING HELD BELOW 
Our Utah Courts have previously held that the failure to keep an adequate record 
of the proceedings constitutes a violation of due process. See, West Valley City v. 
Roberts, 1999 UT App. 358, Tf 14, 993 P.2d 252. Further, USRB Rule 5(g) requires that 
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an audio/digital record of the evidentiary hearing be made: 
"The hearing shall be recorded at Board expense. The Board 
will determine the method of recording and may specify 
recording tape." USRB Rule 5(g) 
Norm requested and paid for a transcript of the evidentiary hearing to be prepared 
by a Certified Court Reporter. Although an audio/digital recording of the hearing was 
made by the USRB, unfortunately, the original audio/digital record is incomplete and 
terminates prior to Norm's counsel's cross-examination of Judy Lund, URS Retirement 
Director. Despite Norm's counsel bringing this issue to the attention to the USRB in his 
post hearing brief,31 and requesting the Hearing Officer to adopt proposed detailed 
findings regarding the testimony of Ms. Lund to remedy this error, the USRB did not 
ultimately address, adopt or explicitely explain its rejection of those proposed findings 
nor did the USRB take any steps to remedy the omission of Ms. Lund's testimony from 
the transcript. From Norm's perspective, and this Court can determine the critical 
importance of Ms. Lund's testimony by casually perusing statement's of fact numbered 
19, 38, and 42 hereinabove in which Ms. Lund acknowledges 1) Norm met all of the 
statutory requirements to receive his thirty-two (32) years of service credit; 2) there were 
no similarly situated employees; and 3) the URS did not have any documentation from 
any URS actuary of any negative actuarial impact in the event that Norm were granted his 
request to retire 32.795 years of service credit. 
As evidenced by the additional evidence set forth in Statements of Fact numbered 
31. See, footnote 1, supra. 
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18 through 42, Norm submits the findings of fact in the USRB's Decision are insufficient 
to allow for an adequate review on appeal. In Tolman v. Salt County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
23, 32 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), this Court noted the necessary detail in findings that must be 
made by an administrative law judge as follows: 
"While it is true that the CSC stated its ultimate conclusions, 
administrative bodies may not rely upon findings that contain 
only ultimate conclusions. See Vali Convalescent & Care 
Insts., 797 P.2d 438, 448 (Utah App.1990). Cf. Boston First 
Nat 7 Bank v. County Bd. Of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 
1166 (Utah 1990) (agency expertise is not a substitute for 
making adequate findings); Williams v. Mountain States Tel 
& Tel Co., 763 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1988) ("commission 
expertise is not an adequate basis upon which ultimate 
findings ... may be based," quoting Mountain States Legal 
Foundation v. Public Serv. Comm'n 636 P.2d 1047, 1051 
(Utah 1981)). We cannot conclude from the mere statement 
of the ultimate conclusions reached by the CSC that the CSC 
ever actually considered and determined Tolman's legal 
claims in accordance with established legal principles.™8 
FN8. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly described the 
detail required in administrative findings in order for a 
reviewing court to protect the public from "arbitrary and 
capricious administrative actions." Milne Truck Lines, 720 
P.2datl378. 
fAn administrative body] cannot discharge its statutory 
responsibilities without making findings of fact on all 
necessary ultimate issues under the governing statutory 
standards. It is also essential that [an administrative body] 
make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the 
critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted and 
resolved in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a 
logical and legal basis or the ultimate conclusions. The 
importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings 
of fact is essential to a proper determination by an 
administrative agency. To that end, findings should be 
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact 
and law, are reached. See generally, Rucker v. Dalton, 
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598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Without such findings, 
this Court cannot perform its duty of reviewing [an 
administrative body's] order in accordance with 
established legal principals and of protecting the parties 
and the public from arbitrary and capricious administrative 
action. 
Id. (emphasis added). Given the incomplete nature of the 
record in this case, see note 5, the failure of the CSC to make 
detailed findings was in itself an abuse of discretion. See 
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm % 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 
App.1990). Cf. Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d at 
709-10 (district court permitted to accept additional evidence 
in rule 65B proceedings when city council failed to enter 
formal findings)." (Underlining emphasis supplied). 
During the evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer noted that facts appeared to be 
undisputed, but that there appeared to be a question of law. R. 383 p. 87. The parties 
were, however, unable to reach a full stipulation as to the facts and proceeded to present 
their witnesses and testimony. In his August 15, 2006 Ruling, the Hearing Officer again 
noted that the testimony was undisputed as follows: "3. The undisputed facts in this case 
do not rise to the level to work an estoppel against the Respondent..." R. 239 - 241; 
Ruling at page 2. However, the USRB's Decision is bereft of the factual findings 
regarding the "undisputed record testimony" of the Petitioner's witnesses regarding his 
claim for estoppel (e.g. whether the Hearing Officer determined one witness was credible 
over another, etc.). In addition to the transcript prematurely ending during Ms. Lund's 
direct examination by Respondent's counsel, the quality of the transcript is such that the 
certified court transcriber could not adequately hear the testimony of the witness, and 
there are fifty-three (53) times in which the words "inaudible" appear in the transcript. 
Although the USRB ruled that the undisputed facts do not rise to the level of 
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estoppel, because the necessary factual findings supporting Norm's claims are not 
included in the Findings and Order, as required under Tolman, the USRB's failure to 
make such findings constitutes an abuse of discretion and constitutes reversible error on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Norm respectfully requests that this Court reverse the USRB' s Decision in its 
entirety and order the Respondents to permit Norm to retire with his full 32.795 years of 
service credit as sought in his Request for Board Action dated January 18, 2006 (a copy is 
attached as Exhibit E to the Addendum submitted concurrently herewith). Norm 
respectfully requests that the Court schedule oral argument on this matter. 
DATED this faft dayof fQcud) ,2007. 
Respectfully submitted, 
IOMAA^Q^ 
Phillij/ W. Dyer, Esq. ~ 
Carey A. Seager, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellant Norman O. Whitaker 
MI\E:\client\Whitaker\Brief of Appellant 
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